Wittgenstein on the Chain of Reasons

Wittgenstein-Studien 7 (1): 105–30. 2016. doi:10.1515/witt-2016-0108

This article examines Wittgenstein’s conception of rationality through the central image of the “chain,” arguing that reasons are defined by their relational role in making actions intelligible rather than by intrinsic properties. The author contends that unlike chains of causes, chains of reasons are necessarily finite and anchored in communal reason-giving practices, meaning that justification inevitably ends at the boundaries of a specific language game. Ultimately, the paper suggests that this finite structure liberates agents from the misleading expectation of infinite justification while simultaneously limiting the reach of reasons to the specific practices that sustain them.

action theory, Wittgenstein, reasons and causes, philosophy of mind, explanation, justification

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